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core indicators for the total environment could supplement the specific indi-
cators for each policy field. 
An issue not addressed in the chapters that follow is the policy relevance of 
the indicators for SOx and aerosol particles. Due to the regional cooling effect 
?f these emissions, reductions will lead to a worsening of the climate change 
mdex. However, since emissions of SOx and aerosol particles have other 
negative environmental effects (acidification, human health), emission reduc-
tions are justified for reasons other than climate change. Therefore, the policy 
relevance of inclusion of these indicators into a climate change index is 
highly disputable. 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In general, the indicators for climate change are well defined and consensus 
between scientists is relatively high. However, there is discussion on the 
relative importance of indicators and the best set of core indicators. This 
relates to four particular indicators. First, N20, which is an important green-
house gas, but whose emissions are hard to reduce; second, NOx, which has a 
:elatively limited importance for climate change, but may be a very important 
md1cator for total environmental quality; third, CFCs, for which emissions 
have been reduced drastically due to the implementation of phasing-out ac-
t10ns under the Montreal Protocol, and finally, SO, and aerosol particles, for 
which the policy relevance of inclusion in a climate change index is highly 
disputable. 
An issue not addressed in the chapters that follow is how to aggregate the 
indicators into one climate change index. Partly, the concept of global warm-
ing potentials, a measure of the relative radiative effects of greenhouse gases, 
can be used for this aggregation. However, global warming potentials have 
not been quantified for all greenhouse gases. The chapter on climate change 
m the TEP! publication on Indicator Definition2 provides a more detailed 
discussion on the various aspects of aggregation. 
NOTES 
l. A Nati~nal Communication is a report on greenhouse gas emissions and mitigation policies 
and options that every party has to submit to the secretariat of the UNFCCC. 
2. See Foreword. 
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1. THE PROBLEM OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
Changeability is an inherent component of climate on all time scales of 
variation. The importance of this changeability for people has largely been 
experienced through its influence on food production. For almost all of hu-
man history the harvesting of food has been the single most crucial determinant 
of well-being and socio-cultural development. It is even possible to speculate 
that the ecological dominance of the human species owes a great deal to its 
capability to survive and adapt to the swings of the climatic pendulum. The 
vital harvest surplus on which so much depended has always been largely 
determined by the vagaries of temperature and rainfall. Today, despite tech-
nological advancement - perhaps even more so because of it - humans 
remain highly susceptible to the jolts of a climatic system the functioning of 
which is only imperfectly understood. The lessons of history, however, dem-
onstrate that climatic variability is ignored only at the cost of compromising 
the well-being of ourselves or our children, an unsustainable situation that 
runs counter to any principles of intergenerational equity. 
Public sensitization to the problems of climate change has grown with the 
realization that, while for most of recorded history humans have been the 
prisoners of climate, today the converse may be true. The future course of 
global climate seems increasingly likely to be determined by the aggregation 
of individual assaults on the composition of the atmosphere by people and 
nation states acting in their own self-interest and armed with the technologies 
of the Industrial Revolution. In the most recent report of the Intergoverrunen-
tal Panel on Climate Change, the considered opinion of some 2500 scientists 
was that 'the balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence on 
global climate' (Houghton et al., 1996). Such impacts on the atmosphere 
necessitate a radical change in approach in terms of managing the atmos-
pheric environment. The norms of the 30-year climate average, for so long 
used to build bridges, darns, sea walls and drainage systems, and to help 
manage the technological fabrications of modern life, are now more unsound 
than ever as awareness of the complex mix of natural and human-induced 
,n 
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climatic variability has increased. The long-term planning necessary for modem 
agriculture, urban settlement, coastal management, industry and a host of 
other endeavours has become fraught with difficulty as the future course of 
climate threatens a change more rapid over this century than over the ten 
millennia since the end of the last glaciation. This rate of change, increasing 
global temperature averages by 0.25°C per decade, and altering a multitude 
of other climatic variables in a similar fashion, may be rapid enough severely 
to stress natural as well as human ecosystems. 
Environmental hazards, such as those associated with climate change, 
always most affect the margins of society. The climatic extinction of early 
European settlers on Greenland is a good example of this vulnerability. As 
the Medieval Warm Period, in which their initial colonies had been estab-
lished, waned and the increased sea ice and storminess of the northern ocean 
beckoned the approach of the Little Ice Age, their inability to adapt and 
respond to climate change ultimately sealed their fate. On the margins of 
viable precipitation in semi-arid zones such as the Sabel, a similar hardship 
has been evident in more recent times. Those most vulnerable to climate 
change are frequently those with fewest resources and those who have been 
least instrumental in causing climate change. It is incumbent therefore on the 
scientific conununity to provide the best possible advice to decision-makers 
to enable mitigation of possible adverse effects, or indeed to capitalize on 
some of the new advantages climate change will confer on certain areas. In 
keeping with the principles of sustainable development espoused by the 
World Commission on Environment and Development (1987), such a 'no 
regrets' or 'precautionary principle' approach will ensure that the positive as 
well as the negative opportunities of climate change are grasped. 
Climate change leads to a complex mixture of associated environmental 
impacts, not capable of being addressed piecemeal. The precise magnitudes 
of these impacts are not yet fully understood, since it is not yet possible to 
project confidently the regional scale of climate change from computer-based 
global circulation models. In addition, since climate-related systems tend to 
be non-linear, certain impacts may not materialize until a critical threshold is 
crossed, by which time recovery may be exttemely difficult. However, as 
models tend to converge increasingly in their predictions, the assessment of 
impacts may be more confidently carried out. It is clear that there will be 
'winners and losers' both between and within countries should climate change 
as suggested by most models occur. For individual countries, especially in the 
developing world, where dependence on the annual harvest is still of crucial 
economic importance, the stakes are high. 
In the first instance, it may be suggested that extra warmth and extra C02 
for photosynthesis will benefit agriculture in many areas. Yield increases of 
over 20 per cent can be expected in many grassland areas of north-western 
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Europe for example, while a poleward expansion in agricultural potential will 
occur. New crops will become viable beyond their present latitudinal and 
altitudinal limits, and additional growth periods will mean greater productiv-
ity, especially for wheat and barley in the higher mid-latitude regions. A 
poleward advance of 150-200 km per one degree centigrade rise in mean 
annual temperature is suggested by the models, with corresponding altitudinal 
changes of 150-200 metres. However, some new regions, such as northern 
Scandinavia, may be unsuitable for accepting new agriculture by virtue of 
their soil endowments. Upland and high-latitude regions with legacies of 
intensive glacial erosion are not going to be able to achieve the yield potential 
which their changed climate might suggest. Elsewhere, especially in the 
interiors of the continents, decreased soil moisture levels will similarly limit 
projected yield increases. Overall, reductions in the principal 'breadbaskets' 
of the mid-latitudes may outweigh increases elsewhere. In the developing 
countries of the lower latitudes, changes in the frequency and severity of such 
hazards as floods, droughts, storms, heatwaves, agricultural pests and dis-
eases may make it difficult for food production to keep pace with population 
growth. 
Similar geographical changes in productivity in ocean fisheries may occur, 
with cold-water species retreating polewards to be replaced by species from 
warmer waters, often less palatable to the consumer. Inland, salmonids may 
be less productive in warmer, less oxygenated, watercourses. Projected drier 
summers in many developed temperate regions will also create problems for 
the maintenance of water quality as dilution water for effluent is reduced. 
However, future rainfall changes are least confidently projected at present by 
global circulation models, mainly because of the difficulties of incorporating 
feedback effects due to cloud and ice-cover changes. Resolving such difficul-
ties as they relate to precipitation holds the key to better assessment of a 
number of potential impacts of climate change. Certainly, new challenges 
will be posed for the husbanding of freshwater resources, in particular in 
coping with seasonal changes in water availability for hydroelectric power, 
irrigation, and domestic and industrial, as well as agricultural, uses. 
Sea-level rise has for long been the touchstone of concern regarding cli-
mate change. As projected increases have diminished over recent years, now 
down to 0.5 m by the end of the twenty-first century, and as confidence in 
such estimates has grown, so more sober assessments of impacts have been 
made. Due to the slower time scale on which ocean systems respond to 
attnospheric changes, this sea-level change may be considered inevitable, and 
the areas under threat may be quite confidently delimited. 
First, there is the probability of a gradual inundation of low-lying lands: 
deltas, marshes and coastal wetlands, estuaries and reclaimed lands in the 
coastal zone. In some cases these are among the most densely populated 
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zones in the world, and their problems may be exacerbated by local land 
subsidence. 
Second, there is the more general problem of storm frequency and storm 
track changes which may accentuate wave attack on exposed coastal areas. 
Sea defences built in former times may need considerable strengthening to 
cope with higher and more frequent storm surges. Greater expanses of warmer 
water may also extend the ranges of tropical disturbances, posing a threat to 
areas further polewards of their present influence, while greater latent heat 
release may also increase the vigour and damage potential of mid-latitude 
depressions. Even under conditions of a slight sea-level rise, dramatic changes 
in the statistical recurrence intervals of marine incursions and coastal erosion 
may occur. Destabilization of dune and coastal barriers, and mobilization of 
coastal sediments will pose problems for the management of coastal zones. 
Third, as sea level rises, coastal groundwater tables will rise, making for 
drainage difficulties and also increasing the risk of aquifer salinization. Pub-
lic fear of coastal inundation cannot often be assuaged rationally, and 'hard' 
engineering schemes are frequently demanded to protect coasts. These will 
often not be practical outside of heavily urbanized areas. Planned retreat and 
precautionary planning in relation to infrastructure and settlement will be the 
only options available in many rural locations. 
A final set of impacts relates to transformations of treasured landscapes 
and wildlife habitats. These are not easily quantifiable or amenable to tradi-
tional cost-benefit analysis. Peatlands, for example, can be considered as 
'cultural' resources and the few raised bogs remaining intact in Europe are 
particularly vulnerable to drying out in 'greenhouse' summers. Sand dunes, 
fens, salt marshes and machair can likewise be considered environments 
under threat. All these ecosystems have often unique flora and fauna! assem-
blages which society in general is loath to see disappear and which current 
EU policies are designed to protect. 
2. THE NEED FOR CENTRAL POLITICAL 
INTERVENTION 
The atmosphere is the last of the 'free' resources. Throughout history, owner-
ship and utilization rights for natural resources, such as land, water, forests, 
minerals and so on have gradually become institutionalized and regulated as 
societies have recognized that freedom of access to 'common' resources 
leads to over-utilization and ruin. The assimilative capacity of the atmosphere 
for greenhouse gas emissions appears to have been exceeded, with reductions 
in anthropogenic emissions of over 60 per cent for carbon dioxide and 15-20 
per cent for methane required to stabilize atmospheric concentrations at 
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present-day levels. This poses global as well as local problems since the 
consequences of failing to reduce such emissions may ultimately produce 
warmer climates beyond human experience, and accelerate and accentuate 
the impacts discussed above. 
One appropriate analogy is that of a common area of pasture, open to all 
the herders of a particular village, where the positive marginal return to each 
individual of increasing his/her stocking level beyond its carrying capacity is 
achieved at the negative cost of impairment of the resource for the entire 
community. It will always be in the individual's and even in the nation state's 
interest to use the free dispersive capacity of the atmosphere as a sink for 
waste. It will always be economically easy to justify unilateral increases in 
greenhouse gas emissions either because an individual's relative contribution 
is small, a country is developing rapidly to catch up with its competitors, or a 
'special case' applies for some reason. 
Accordingly, a consensus at a global level can only be achieved by 
supranational bodies. Climate change is thus no different from other global 
environmental issues such as acid rain or ozone depletion in requiring inter-
national management. In the case of regional economic groupings, such as 
the European Union, international management is also necessary to standard-
ize emission control costs between Member States in order to ensure the cost 
burden is equitably distributed. For an emergent problem, such as climate 
change, where the evidence is as yet uncertain and the natural variability of 
the climate system is similar to possible anthropogenic changes observed to 
date, a judgement must also be made on when to take action and over what 
time scale the burden of inconvenience should be spread. A judgement must 
also be made on what is technically and economically feasible, that is, a best 
practicable means/best available technology approach. Such management 
decisions require organizations with the capability of placing global priorities 
above national interests. Central political intervention is thus necessary in the 
climate change problem at a scale above that of national governments. This 
thinking underlies the formation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change in 1988 as a joint creation of the World Meteorological Organization 
and the United Nations Environment Programme. 
It is the judgement of the IPCC that the time has come to set limits on 
emissions of the major greenhouse gases. The emission rduction commitment 
of the EU under the Kyoto Protocol is 8 per cent on 1990 levels, to be 
achieved by 2010. A primary focus on carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous 
oxide is apparent in seeking to achieve this objective. Annual emissions of 
these three gases constitute the three leading core pressure indicators identi-
fied in the EU Pressure Indicators Project. There is scientific consensus on 
the belief that changes in annual emissions of these three gases will provide 
the best criteria against which progress in slowing human-induced climate 
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change in the twenty-first century can be monitored. A fourth greenhouse gas 
family, chlorofluorocarbons, is now considered less influential as an indicator 
of global warming, and 'Annual CFC emissions' rank fourth in the core 
pressure indicators list. This is a reflection of the reductions in emissions 
already under way as a result of the Montreal Protocol to address the problem 
of stratospheric ozone depletion. 
It is important to note, however, that the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change ultimately seeks to achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations, a much more difficult objective to realize, entailing reduc-
tions in greenhouse gas emissions in excess of 50 per cent. It is appropriate 
that the lead, both for short- and medium-term actions, should be taken by 
industrialized countries, since the bulk of emissions has emanated from such 
areas, and their scope for reductions without hardship is greater. Developing 
countries should also, within the limits of their economic circumstances, take 
steps to decouple energy growth from economic growth where possible. Only 
by a dual-track approach can political intervention forge the partnership of all 
nations that is necessary to provide an effective attack on the problem. 
3. ACTION TO SLOW AND STABILIZE GREENHOUSE-
GAS-LED CLIMATE CHANGE 
There is no prospect at present of shifting the direction or magnitude of 
natural trends in climate. It is unclear what direction this natural trend is 
currently taking, either to reinforce or mitigate human forcing of climate 
change. Equally, because of the long atmospheric lifetime of some green-
house gas emissions, such as carbon dioxide (100-200 years), a commitment 
to increasing concentrations presently exists. This means that, even if all 
anthropogenic emissions had been halted in 1990, about 50 per cent of the 
increase in atmospheric concentrations due to human activities would still be 
evident by 2100. These considerations, augmented by political difficulties 
especially between the developed and developing countries, such as those 
which have surfaced at recent Conferences of the Parties to the UN Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, suggest that a 'business-as-usual' 
scenario must be considered for greenhouse gas emissions for the immediate 
future at least. 
Short-term actions to stabilize emissions should focus first on methane 
emissions, which have a relatively short lifetime in the atmosphere (11 years). 
Improvements in methane concentrations would thus be noticeable almost 
immediately. This explains the strong emphasis given to methane emissions 
per year as a core pressure indicator. A modest reduction of only 1 O per cent 
in emissions would stabilize methane concentrations and this is readily achiev-
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able in the short term. First, action to reduce biomass_ burning by discourag-
. deforestation would considerably curtail the 40 milhon tonnes emitted to ~ Id. dd .. h 
th unosphere from this source each year. It wou , m a it10n, ave a ea d . d beneficial effect in increasing C02 removal processes. Secon , repair an 
better ongoing maintenance of natural gas pipelines shouM be undertaken 
throughout Europe and in countries such as Russia to ehmmate leakages as 
far as possible. Although considerable improvements appear to have occurred 
· tackling this problem in recent years, there is still scope for improvmg the 
~:rformance of such installations, which may ~ontrib~te similar amounts of 
methane as biomass burning on an annual basis. Design standards for new 
landfill sites should also be introduced as a matter of urgency so as to enable 
collection or flaring of the gas. This could reduce emissions from this source 
by up to 90 per cent. Increased recycling would of course further reduce gas 
production as well as saving on fossil foe! energy_ expendiWre. Fmally, new 
research indicates that methane em1ss10ns from nee paddies can be greatly 
reduced by regulating the irrigation water more carefully. Such low-cost, 
]ow-technology solutions should be extensively implemented without delay. 
Ultimately, reductions in methane emissions could amount to 5 per cent of 
total greenhouse gas emissions. 
Stabilizing carbon dioxide concentrations before the end of the twenty-first 
century is probably unrealistic, and therefore no stabilization of human-
induced climate change can be expected. Only draconian economic measures 
could achieve carbon dioxide stabilization at today's concentrations and short-
term measures to slow the rate of growth are, therefore, all that is practical. 
Foremost among these must be aggressive energy conservation measures. 
These should focus on improved insulation, lighting and electrical appliance 
efficiency standards in housing, industry and commerce. New homes and 
offices could be at least twice as energy-efficient as at present, while m 
industry the present-day capability for reducing energy consumption is in the 
order of 15--40 per cent. Short-term measures should also focus on develop-
ing and transferring technology relating to energy-saving devices, and 
energy-saving power generation technologies, to developmg countries. This 
is particularly true for cooking and heating technologies. Improved private 
and public transport systems, especially in urban areas, would reduce emis-
sions considerably, as would the immediate incorporation of presently existing 
vehicle energy efficiency technology. A rapid expansion in renewable energy 
generation is also possible with present-day technology. The fact that a 40 per 
cent increase in the energy efficiency of the US economy occurred between 
1973 and 1990 confirms that there is scope for development and energy use 
to be successfully decoupled in the years ahead. 
Looking further ahead, continued improvements in energy efficiency must 
be sought. Structural changes in settlement patterns will be required to lessen 
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the requirement for mobility based on the private car. Compact cities, 
workplaces accessible by public transport, walking or cycling, and energy 
technologies based on hydrogen or safe nuclear fusion hold the best prospect 
for success. These will all, however, entail major changes in infrastructure 
and lifestyle, and will need implementation on time scales which may exceed 
the public's patience. 
4. COMMUNICATING THE PROBLEM TO THE 
GENERAL PUBLIC 
Global warming is now perceived by the general public as an important issue 
facing society. This sensitization has occurred on the back of the ozone 
depletion problem, which stirred the public consciousness on a global envi-
ronmental problem for the first time. Indeed, blurring of the two problems 
has become so entrenched that it is difficult to envisage climate change ever 
being seen by the general public for the separate and more intractable prob-
lem that it is. The fact that the seven warmest years in the global instrumental 
temperature record occurred in the 1990s assisted with this process of 
sensitization. However, society's collective memory is short and the 'post-
Pinatubo' years have seen climate change slip down the political agenda. 
Galvanizing events, such as the spectacular satellite imagery of ozone deple-
tion, are required to mobilize public sentiment and by its nature climate 
change cannot provide the catalytic instances when definite links are appar-
ent between climatic aberrations and greenhouse-led climate change. 
One way of addressing the communication difficulty is by modelling the 
environmental problem concerned using indices which simplify the complex-
ity of the interacting processes. Such a procedure provides the general public, 
and policy-makers, with a tool whereby 'what if' questions may be answered 
at a rudimentary level. This is particularly important for providing initial 
information on the relative merits of alternative mitigation strategies. For 
example, the relative impact of reforestation versus energy savings from 
insulation might be compared, or the impact of foe! switching from coal to 
natural gas. Such an approach may also be integrated with other index sys-
tems currently becoming established, for example indices relating to sustainable 
development as part of general health indicators for the global environment. 
Communicating with the public via indices is already commonplace in 
financial and economic matters. Such indices are in some cases the results of 
a complex calculation, but convey an impressionistic message which can be 
easily grasped. This is a desirable objective in communicating the interre-
lated issues of climate change to the public and to decision-makers. However, 
caution is required when simultaneously employing several indices. The pub-
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lie may get confused when an action causing ~ positive. response in one 
environmental index causes a negative response 1~ a seemmg_ly related one. 
For example, a reduction in stratospheric ozone m polar reg10ns may slow 
lobal warming. A reduction in an air pollution/acidification index may result 
fn an opposite movement in a global warming index. Such divergenc~s are 
difficult for the public to rationalize at first and it may be necessary, m the 
methodology of preparing an index system, to give greater consideration to 
presentation. Indices are essentially a new approach to bridging the gap 
between complex scientific interactions and complex soc10-poht1cal mterac-
tions. If consistent, they are transferable between nations and perhaps 
ultimately between the developed and developing world. They may thus 
ultimately provide a 'single currency' for negotiating an accommodation 
between nations to limit human impact on the functioning of the atmosphere 
and thus assist human transition on to the path to a sustainable world. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Europeans have historically been both winners and losers as climate has 
fluctuated in past times. In the coming decades, the direction of climate will 
be shaped both by natural and, increasingly, by human _influences, posing 
new threats and opportunities for inhabitants of the contment. Indeed, 1t 1s 
probable that, by the end of the twenty-first century, much of Europe will be 
warmer than at any time during the Quaternary Period. Responding to the 
challenges posed by this scenario of climate change will require new skills 
and novel management techniques; indeed, it presently necessitates an urgent 
marriage of scientific and political approaches. The Pressure Indicators Project 
represents such an innovation, a first step to ensuring that the adver~e conse-
quences do not render Europe, and indeed the world, once more a pnsoner of 
the climate system. 
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